Progress of the Law by Editors,
PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS FOR SEPTEMBER.
When a bicyclist comes up behind a pedestrian, who is
unconscious of his approach, and is walking on a path beside
Bicycles, a highway, without giving any warning of his
Injury to approach, and strikes the pedestrian with his
Pedestrian,
Negligence, bicycle, the burden rests on the bicyclist to show
Evidence that he was free from negligence, in order to
relieve himself from liability: Myers v. Hinds, (Supreme Court
of Michigan,) 68 N. W. Rep. 156.
Under the second section of Article 3 of the Constitution
of the United.7States, which provides that the judicial power of
the United States shall extend to all cases affect-
Conflict of
Laws, ing ambassadors, other public ministers, and con-
Courts, suls a state court has no jurisdiction in a civil case
Jurisdiction, y
State and over the person of a consul of a foreign govern-
Federal,
consul of ment resident in the state, irrespective of the repeal
Foreign of the judiciary act of 1789: Wilcox v. Luco,.
Nation
(Supreme Court of California,) 45 Pac. Rep. 676.
To the same effect are Davis v. Packard, 7 Pet. 276, 1833;
Miller v. Van Loben Seis, 66 Cal. 341 ; S.C., 5 Pac. Rep. 5 12,
1885.
The Laws of New York of 1896, c. 427, § I, created a.
board of four police commissioners for the city of Albany, to be
Constitutional elected by the common council, and provided that
Law, not more than two of them should belong to the
Election of
Officers, same political party; that for the purpose of such
Appointment, election, the members of the council attending the
Minority
Representation meeting should constitute a quorum; that each
member of the council should be entitled to vote for not more
than two commissioners; that if a vacancy should occur in
the board of police commissioners, it should be filled by
appointment by the mayor, on the written recommendation of
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a majority of the members of the common council belonging
to the same political party as the commissioner whose office
should become vacant; and that no person should be eligible
to the office of police commissioner unless he was a member of
the political party having the highest or next highest repre-
sentation in the common council. In Rathbone v. Wirtl. 40
N. Y. Suppl. 535, this statute was held unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court of New York, (Appellate Division, Third
Department,) on the ground that it infringed the rights of the
majority to govern by giving the minority equal power with
the majority in the selection of police commissioners; that
the pow'rer of the legislature to determine the method of filling
a newly-created office does not go to the extent of permitting
it to prescribe a method by which the right of the majority of
the electors to select the officer may be defeated; and that
the act could not be sustained on the ground that it secured
minority representation, since it put the minority on an
equality with the majority. .Landon, J., dissented.
In State v. Thwrson, 68 N. W. Rep. 202, the Supreme
Court of South Dakota has recently decided, (i) That under
Laws S. Dak. 1891, c. 57, § 12, which providesSubmission
of Question to that "Whenever any proposed constitution or
Voters, constitutional amendment or other question is to
injunction be submitted to the people of the state for popular
vote, the secretary of state shall . . . . certify the same to the
auditor of each county in the state," it is the duty of the sec-
retary to certify a question directed by the legislature as to
whether a provision of the constitution shall be repealed,
though an affirmative answer by the people would not affect
the constitution, and the submission is therefore practically
useless; (2) That an injunction to enjoin the submission of a
constitutional amendment to the vote of the people because
the submission is invalid will not lie merely at the instance of a
taxpayer and elector, since the taxpayer will receive no
substantial injury from such submission; and (3) That the
courts have no jurisdiction to prevent the submission to the
people, as directed by the legislature, of a question involving
an amendment to the constitution, by enjoining the secretary
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of state from certifying the question to the county auditors, as
such action would be an unwarranted interference with the
authority of the legislature.
A debt arising on a contract for the purchase of goods,
entered into in November, 1891, but under which there is no
Corporations, delivery until October, 1892, is not, prior to such
Failure to File delivery, an existing debt, within the meaning of a
Annual
Statement, statute (Pub. Stat. R. I. c. 155, §§ II, 12,) pro-
Liability of viding that upon the failure of a manufacturing
Stockholder,mauctrn
Existing Debt corporation to-file a statement of its conc:tion on
or before a certain day in each year the stockholder shall be
liable for any debt of the corporation then existing, for this
liability not being contractual, but purely statutory, and in
derogation of the common law, the statute must be strictly
pursued: Wing v. Slater, (Supreme Court of Rhode Island,)
35 Atl. Rep. 302.
A bookkeeper of a corporation, who has no pecuniary
interest therein, though elected to a vacancy in the board of
Insolvency, directors, and made a nominal holder of stock for
Preferred that purpose, is entitled to preference on the insol-
Claims vency of the corporation, under Act N. J. 1892,
P. L. 426, which provides that "the laborers and workmen,
and all persons doing labor or service of whatever character
in the regular employ of such corporation, shall have a first
and prior lien :" Consolidated Coal Co. v. Keystone Chemical Co.,
(Court of Chancery of N. J., Pitney, V. C.,) 35 Atl. Rep. 157.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Alabama, authority to an agent to vote at a corporate meeting
Meetings, upon the stock of his principal does not empower
Voting, the agent to act for his principal in connection
Principal and with the other stockholders, who were also credi-
Agent,
Powers of -tors of the corporation, in regard to the cancellation
Agent of a mortgage of the corporation, given to secure
claims of the principal and those stockholders against the
corporation: Moore v. Ensley, 20 So. Rep. 744.
It is not ultra vires for a manufacturing corporation to pur-
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,chase a large tract of land for the purpose of erecting thereon
Ultra Vires, its factories and residences for its employes, and
Providing to contribute toward the establishment there of a
Residences,
etc., church, a school, a free library, and a free bath
for Employes for its employes: Steinway v. Steinway & Sons,
(Supreme Court of New York, Special Term, New York
County,) 4o N. Y. SuppI. 718.
After a jury has been impaneled and sworn in a criminal
case, the trial cannot stop short of a verdict without the con-
'Criminal Law, sent of the defendant, except for imperative rea-
T'*, Ve In sons, such as the illness of a juror, the judge, or
Jeopardy,
Withdrawal the defendant, the absence of a juror, or a dis-
of Case from
Jury, agreement, and, therefore, when a case, after the
Consent trial has commenced, is withdrawn from the jury
on account of the absence of a witness for the state, the
defendant has been'onceiplaced in jeopardy, and may plead it
in bar of another trial, unless he consents thereto; and such
,consent is not established by the mere fact that a defendant
without counsel does not object to the withdrawal of the case
from the jury, and the postponement of the trial, nor will
that fact constitute a waiver of his right to plead the with-
,drawal in bar of another trial for the same offence: State v.
Richardson, (Supreme Court of South Carolina,) 25 S. E.
Rep. 220.
The principles on which the enforcement of building restric-
tions contained in a deed depend, have recently been thor-
Deed, oughly examined and defined by Vice Chancellor
Building Emery, of the Court of Chancery of New Jersey,
.Restrictions,
waiver, in Trout v. Lucas, 35 AUt. Rep. 153. He holds
raches (i) That when a tract of land is laid out by the
owner into lots and blocks f6r sale, in accordance with a
general scheme, by which restrictions as to building are
imposed on each purchaser, for the benefit of all the land, and
these restrictions are embodied in the conveyances, the right
,of one lot owner to enforce the covenant against another is
not a legal, but a purely equitable one; and being such, the
restrictions will only be enforced when it would be equitable
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to do so; and (2) That a court of equity will not require the
removal of a building, on the ground that it is in violation of'
a covenant in the deed of the owner, when his grantor and
the owners of other lots permitted its erection without objec-
tion; and subsequent purchasers are bound by the acqui-
escence or laches of their grantors.
In the case in hand, the deeds to lots in a tract of land
contained covenants that the grantees should not build thereon
nearer than twenty-five feet to certain streets; but a purchaser
erected a building less than twenty-two feet distant from the
street, and six years later added a tower to the building,
extending to within about eleven feet of the street. No
objection was made by the grantor or other owners when the
building and tower were erected. The complainant, who
bought his lots at about the same time that the tower was
erected, and made no objection to the encroachment at the
time, brought suit about three years later for a mandatory
injunction to remove so much of the building as stood within.
twenty-five feet of the street; but this was refused.
In the opinion of the Supreme Court of South Dakota, a
general deposit of public funds by a public officer subject to
Deposit of check, is not a "loan " within the statutory and
Public constitutional prohibition against the loaning of
Funds,
Loan public funds, with or without interest: Allibone
v. Ames, 68 N. W. Rep. 165.
According to a recent decision of the Queen's Bench
Division, the rule that delivery of a chattel is essential to con-
Donatio stitute a valid donatio causa morlis is satisfied by
Causa Mortis, an antecedent delivery of the chattel to the donee,.
Delivery though alio intuitu : Cain v. Moon, [1896] 2 Q..
B. 283.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky has lately held that presi-
dential electors are state officers, within the meaning of a consti-
Elections, tutional provision, (Const. Ky. § 152,) which
Appointment,
Vacancies, provides that if the unexpired term of an elective
State Officers, officer does not end at the next succeeding annual
Presidential
Electors election at which either city or state officers, etc.,
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are elected, and three months intervene before such election,.
the office shall be filled by appointment until said election, and
then said vacancy shall be filled by election : Todd v. Johnson,.
36 S. W. Rep. 987.
In answer to a communication from the Governor, the-
Supreme Court of Rhode Island has declared that under the
Qualifications Constitution of Rhode Island, Art. 2, § i, which
of Voters, provides that an elector who is to be qualified to
Ownersbip of
Rea Estate vote by reason of ownership of real estate shall
be " one who is really and truly possessed in his own right
of real estate,... .being an estate in fee simple, fee tail, for
the life of any person, or an estate in reversion or remainder
which qualifies no other person to vote," the owner of an
equitable estate in land is not a qualified elector: In re
Qualifications of Electors, 35 Atl. Rep. 213.
In a recent case before the Supreme Court of Errors of
Connecticut, McAdam v. Central Ry. & Electric Co., 35 Atl.
Electric Rep. 341, the defendant, an electric street railway
Railways, and light company, had constructed its railway in
Negligence,
Master and such a manner that the support and span wires,
Servant which passed over the trolley wire, might become
dangerous by contact with the latter, unless properly insulated.
The plaintiff, a lineman of the company, received an electric
shock on taking hold of a support wire, due to the fact that
a span wire, which was not insulated, had come in contact
with the trolley wire, and was thrown to the ground and
injured. In an action by him to recover damages, it was held
that a finding that the company was guilty of- negligence ren-
dering it liable for the injuries received by the plaintiff was
proper.
In the opinion of the Supreme Court of Michigan, an
assignment by an executor appointed by the pro-Equitable
Assignment, bate court, who has secured the probate of the
Compensation will, of compensation to be earned in defending
of Executor against an appeal, is void as against public policy:
In re King's Estate, 68 N. W. Rep. 154.
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In Norton v. Dashwood, [1896] 2 Ch. 497, Justice Chitty,
of the Chancery Division, has lately held, that tapestry which
had been cut and pieced so as to cover the wallsFixtures,
Tapestry, of a. room and the space left by the doors. and
Devise mantelpiece, and was hung by being nailed to
wooden buttons let into the plaster and nailed to the brick-
work, passed as a fixture under a devise of the mansion-house.
This decision was based upon D'Eyncourt v. Gregory, 3 L. R.
Eq. 382, 1866, where a testator, who was tenant for life of
settled estates, on which he had erected, fitted up, and fur-
nished a mansion-house, (an old one having fallen into decay,)
bequeathed all the tapestry, marbles, statues, pictures with their
frames and glasses, which should be in or about the house at
the time of his death, and of which he had power to dispose,
to be enjoyed as heir-looms by the person who, under the
limitations in his will, would be entitled to his own estates
thereby devised in strict settlement, being the same as those
entitled to the settled estates, subject to a condition, with a
shifting clause in case the condition was not fulfilled. After
the testator's death, A. became tenant for life of both the
settled and devised estates, and on his death the settled estates
devolved on B.; but, as the condition was not fulfilled, C.
became entitled to the devised estate, and to the heir-looms
under the shifting clause in the testator's will. The question
arose, as between B. and C., which of the articles passed under
the will; and it was held, that tapestry, pictures in frames,
frames filled with satin, and attached to the walls, and also
statues, figures, vases and stone garden-seats, purchased and
set in place by the testator, which were essentially part of the
house, or of the architectural design of the building or grounds,
however fastened, were fixtures, and could not be removed;
but that glasses and pictures not in panels, not being part of
the building, and articles purchased by the testator, but fixed
in place by A. after his death, were not fixtures, and passed to
C., under the will.
The Supreme Court of Michigan, abandoning the views
expressed in People v.. O'Neil, 71 Mich. 325 ; . C:, 39 N;W.
PROGRESS OF THE -LAW.
Game Laws, Rep. i, holds now that an act (Laws Mich.
Prohibition of 1893, No. 196, § 5,) which prohibits the sale or
Sale or
Possession, possession for the purpose of sale of any kind
Constitutionality of bird, game, or fish, at any time when the
of Laws taking, catching, or killing thereof is prohibited
by law, and another (Laws Mich. 1895, No. 223,) prohibiting
the sale of quail at any time, apply to the sale or possession of
game killed out of the state, and are not unconstitutional, as
interfering with interstate commerce, but are a valid exercise
of the police power of the state: Peole v. O'Neil, 68 N. W.
Rep. 227.
This view has unfortunately been adopted by the weight of
authority: Whitehead v. Smithers, 2 C. P. D. 553, 1877;
Ex p. Maier, 103 Cal. 476, 1894; Magner v. People, 97 Ill.
320, 1881; State v. Randolpz, i Mo. App. 15, 1876; Statev.
Rodman, 58 Minn. 393, 1894; N. Y Assn. for Protection oj
Game v. Durham, 51 N. Y. Super. Ct. 306, 1885; Roth v.
State, 51 Ohio St. 209, 1894, affirming 7 Ohio Cir. Ct. 62,
1893; and has been applied to the keeping of game in cold
storage: State v. Judy, 7 Mo. App. 524, 1879; and to the
catching of trout artificially propagated: Comm. v. Gilbert,
I6o Mass. 157, 1893; though how it can be held that a sta-
tute which forbids the bare possession of such game is con-
stitutional, passes any ordinary mind to discover. When the
prohibition is of possession for the purpose of sale, as in the
principal case, such an act is of course constitutional; and it
will not be construed to apply to imported game sold in the
original package: Exp. Maier, 103 Cal. 476, 1894.
The minority doctrine, that such a statute cannot be
intended to apply to imported game, since its object is the
preservation of game within the limits of its own authority, is
more conducive to justice and more consonant with sound
reason ; especially in view of the fact that the close seasons
differ in different states, so that the killing may be lawful:
Comm. v. Hall, 128 Mass. 410, I 88o; Comm. v. Wilkinson,
139 Pa. 298, S. C., 27 W. N. C. I6o, 21 Atl. Rep. 14,
1891; see Allen v. Young, 76 Me. 8o, 1883. But this,
though once upheld by it: People v. O'Neil, 71 Mich. 325,
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S. C., 39 N. W. Rep. 1, 1888, the Supreme Court of Michi-
gan, for some reason, has seen fit to abandon.
In a recent case before the Supreme Court of California, the
defendant, who was an officer of a corporation and a large
Guaranty, stockholder therein, with the intent of relieving
Collateral the demands of other creditors, urged the plaintiff
Undertaking,
Statute of to invest P ,500 in the stock of the corporation,
Frauds and verbally agreed with him that he should buy
the stock and pay the price thereof to the company, and that
in the event of the stock becoming worthless, he, (the defend-
ant,) would repay to the plaintiff the price paid for the stock.
This was held to be an original contract, and therefore not
within the statute of frauds: Ki/bride v. Moss, 45 Pac. Rep. 812.
When several persons attack another, intending merely to
frighten and beat him, and not to do him any severe bodily
Homicide, harm, but the person so. assailed has reasonable
Excusable ground to believe, from the nature of the attack
-and the surrounding circumstances, that there is a design to
kill him, and so believing shoots and kills one of his assailants,
the homicide is justifiable: State v. Lima, (Supreme Court of
Louisiana,) 20 So. Rep. 737.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
.South Carolina, when the body of a murdered man was burned
Homicide, and mutilated beyond recognition, testimony that
-Corpus Delicti a piece of charred cloth, found among the ashes with
the deceased, was like the cloth of which the trousers he wore at
the time of his disappearance were made, and that a slate pencil
found there was identical with one carried by the deceased, and
known to be such by a certain indentation on the side, was
competent evidence to establish the identity of the body, its
sufficiency being for the jury: Stae v.Martin, 25 S. E. Rep. 113.
The Supreme Court of Indiana has again scotched the
.schemes of the sporting fraternity to evade the provisions of
Horse the Roby Race-Track Law of March 5, 1895, P.
Racing, L. 92, which provided (§ I) that there shall be
Evasion of
Statute no horse-racing from November 15th to April 15th
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-in every year; (§ 2) that "it shall be unlawful for any person,
-corporation, company or association to hold or advertise for a
race meeting oftener than three times in any year, and no
race meeting shall be held longer than fifteen days. It shall
be unlawful to hold any race meeting oftener than twice in
any period of sixty days, and it shall also be unlawful
to hold any race meeting until after the full period of
thirty days has elapsed after a meeting has been held; "
prescribes penalties for the violation of its provisions, and
gives a remedy by injunction against threatened viola-
tions of the act (§ 4.) The first attempt to evade this
statute was by organizing three several companies or associa-
tions to hold race meetings alternately upon the same track,
so that they might each hold a race meeting on the Roby
race track for the statutory period of fifteen days, and in such
order that, when each association came to hold its second and
every subsequent race meeting, there would be a space of
thirty full days between each of its meetings, and thus make
the race meeting continuous from the i5th of April to the
15th of November of each year. Action was brought against
those interested in the association to recover the statutory
penalty; and the lower court held the evasion legal, and sus-
tained a demurrer to the complaint. This judgment was
reversed by the Supreme Court, which held that it made no
difference whether the second or other subsequent meeting
held within the thirty days was held by the same party that
held the former meeting or by a different party, company or
association, and construed the statute to forbid a race meeting
to be held for a longer period than fifteen days at one time
and less than thirty days subsequent to the last race meet-
ing held at the same place, regardless of the person,
company or association holding either of such meetings:
State v. Roby, 142 Ind. 168, S. C., 41 N. E. Rep. 145,
1895. That decision "seems to have been cheerfully acqui-
esced in by the people attempting to carry on race meetings
in Lake county. But a striking coincidence occurs. No
sooner was the former decision finally confirmed, than arrange-
ments were set on foot, not only to continue the race business
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at Roby, but arrangements were made to construct two other
race tracks as close to Roby as they could conveniently be-
made." These tracks were constructed, one separated from
Roby by a highway only, and the other less than half a mile-
away. The state, through the attorney general, brought suit
for an injunction under the act against the owners of the
three tracks. The evidence of the defendants, the proprietors.
of these tracks, showed that horse racing was profitable only
when horses could be kept together for a long period; that.
the arrangement between the proprietors of the three tracks.
was that Roby should open and run for fifteen days, then
Forsythe for the next fifteen days, and then Sheffield for the next.
fifteen days, thus leaving a period of thirty days since Roby
closed, and that then the merry-go-round should begin again;.
that only one track should be open during the fifteen days
that another was running; that the same judge acted at all
the tracks, the same horses were entered, and at the end of the
fifteen days the meeting was simply transferred from one track.
to another; and that the horses remained located in the
various barns in which they were quartered without regard to
the particular track on which they might be racing. Yet the-
same judge refused the temporary injunction prayed for and
on the final hearing found for the defendants, and refused a-
motion for a new trial made by the plaintiff. This judgment
was of course reversed, the Supreme Court holding that the
three successive meetings, though held on separate tracks
owned and controlled by separate companies or associations,.
under the evidence constituted but one race meeting, and were
within the prohibition bf the statute; and that the finding of
the trial court that the races conducted at each track consti-
tuted a separate and distinct race meeting, was in effect a con-
clusion of law, and not of fact, and was therefore open to-
review and correction on appeal: State v. Forsythe, 44 N. E.
Rep. 593.
A policy which insures against loss or damage to property,.
whether owned by the insured or others, for which the insured,
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may be liable, resulting from the explosion of aBoiler
Insurance, steam boiler, and also against loss of life or injury
Nature of to persons, whether employes of the insuredContract
or strangers, caused by such explosion, payable to
the insured for the benefit of such persons or their legal repre-
sentatives, is a contract of indemnity, and a person injured by
such an explosion cannot sue the insurance company: Embler
v. Harford Steam Boiler Inspection & Insurance Co., (Supreme
Court of New York, Appellate Division, Third Department,)
4o N. Y. Suppl. 450.
The Court of Appeal of England has recently decided a
very interesting question of marine insurance, on appeal from
Marine a decision of Gorell Barnes, J., (The Copernicus,
Insurance, [1896] P. 154). By a policy on freight, "at and
Freight,
Commence. from any port or ports of loading on the west
ment of Risk, coast of South America to any port or ports of
Engagement
of Goods, discharge in the United Kingdom," the freight
Loading Port was to be covered "from the time of the engage-
ment of the goods." Goods were engaged for the vessel
which was to carry the freight, and were ready for shipment
in her at the time of her loss, which occurred before she
arrived at her first loading port on the west coast of South
America. The owners of the vessel sued for the insurance on
the freight, but judgment was given for the defendant; and
this was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, on the ground that
the "engagement" clause must be construed with reference to
the voyage described in the policy, and that, therefore, as the
vessel had not arrived at her first loading port on the west
coast of South America, the risk had not attached: The
Copernicus, [1896] P. 237.
In the opinion of the Supreme Court -of Georgia, a bona
fide "loan" of a pint of whisky by one person to another,
without any criminal intent, the borrower agreeingIntoxicating
Liquors, to return to the "lender" another pint of the same
Sale kind of whisky, which he in fact does, is not a sale
of the whisky within the statute prohibiting the sale of intoxi-
cating liquors, though the whisky "lent" was intended to be
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and was consumed by the borrower: Skinner v. State, 25 S. E.
Rep. 364.
-A statement by a juror to his fellow jurors, that he was a
Jury, member of a grand jury which indicted the defend-
'Misconduct ant for another crime, which he described, will
-vitiate the verdict: Ryan v. State, (Supreme Court of Ten-
nessee,) 36 S. W. Rep. 930.
In Thomas v. Bozven, 45 Pac. Rep. 768, the Supreme Court
of Oregon lately ruled that the following newspaper item. was
libelous per se :
Libel "Charged with Larceny.
"Mrs. Flora Thomas, colored, in the Toils.
"The arrest of Mrs. Flora Thomas, a colored domestic in
the employ of Fannie Hall, the brothel keeper, took place
yesterday by constable Snow, on a warrant charging her with
larceny from a dwelling. The woman has only been in the
employ of Fannie Hall a short time, but long enough, it seems,
for her to ply her kleptomaniac tendencies to their full measure.
Numerous articles were missed from the house at various times,
until finally her apartments in a house on an adjoining block
were searched, and the stolen property found. The woman
was taken before Justice Bentley, who allowed the woman to
go on her own recognizance until her preliminary examination
was called to-day."
According to a recent decision of the Circuit Court of
Appeals of the Ninth Circuit, a local telegraph operator at a
station on the line of a railroad, who receives and
Master and
Servant, delivers the orders of a train dispatcher in respect
Fellow- of the movement of trains, is the fellow-servant of
Servant
the employes of the railroad company in charge
of the trains; and such employes, if injured in consequence of
his negligence, cannot recover damages from the railroad com-
pany: Oregon Short Line & U. N. Ry. Co. v. Frost, 74 Fed.
Rep. 965. Hawley, D. J., dissented, with much reason. The
operator in this case did not have a single badge of the rela-
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tion of fellow-servant, except that he was apparently in the
employ of the company.
The Supreme Court of Ohio holds, that when bonds secured
by one and the same mortgage on corporate property are issued
at different times, the liens of all the bonds out-Mortgage
Bonds, standing in the hands of bona fide purchasers for
Lien, value are equal in priority, since the lien of each
Priority
bond dates from the record of the mortgage that
•secured it, and not from the time it was issued: Pittsburgh,
C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Lynde, 44 N. E. Rep. 596.
The following decision may prove of interest to stamp-col-
lectors. The statute of 47 & 48 Vict. c. 76, § 7, provides
Post Offie, that "a person shall not (a) make, knowingly
Stamps, utter, deal in or sell any fictitious stamp, or know-
Die for
Making Fici.- ingly use for any postal purpose any fictitious
tious Stamp, stamp, or (b) have in his possession, unless he
Possession,
Liabiity shews a lawful excuse, any fictitious stamp, or (c)
make, or, unless he shews a lawful excuse, have in his posses-
sion, any die, plate, instrument, or materials for making any
fictitious stamp," prescribes a penalty for violation of its pro-
visions, and declares that "for the purpose of this section
"fictitious stamp' means any facsimile or imitation or repre-
sentation, whether on paper or otherwise, of any stamp for
denoting any rate of postage, including any stamp for denot-
ing a rate of postage of any of her Majesty's colonies, or of
any foreign country." The proprietor of a newspaper that
circulated among stamp-collectors and others caused a die to
be made for him abroad, from which imitations or repr~senta-
lions of a current colonial postage-stamp could be produced.
The only purpose for which he ordered the die, and kept it in
his possession, was in order to make upon the pages of an
illustrated stamp catalogue or newspaper, called "The Phila-
telist's Supplement," illustrations of the colonial stamp in
black and white only, and not in colors, this special supple-
ment being intended for sale as part of his newspaper. He
,was informed against under the statute; and the magistrate
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stated the case for the opinion of the Queen's Bench Division,
which held that the possession of a die for making a false
stamp, known to its possessor to be such, was, however inno-
cent the use that he intended to make of it, a possession with-
out lawful excuse within the meaning of the act: Dickins v.
Gill, (Queen's Bench Division,) [1896] 2 Q. B. 370.
This decision seems hardly consonant with sound reason.
If the fact that he intended to use the die for the purpose
stated, and no other, was not a lawful excuse, one wonders
what could be; and further, the whole tone of the statute
seems to be that only those stamps and dies are within its
purview which are intended for unlawful use in paying post-
age on mail matter.
The Supreme Court of South Dakota has added itself to the
list of those that hold that since the duty of a public officer or
Public board entrusted with the letting of public contracts
Contracts, to the lowest responsible bidder is not merely a
Award,
Lowest ministerial one, but involves the exercise of dis-
Responsible cretion, their judgment'in awarding such contracts
Bidder,
Mandamus cannot be controlled by mandamus; and also
holds, as a matter of course, that since the issue of a per-
emptory mandamus in such a case is erroneous, a commitment
for a refusal to comply therewith is a nullity: In re Mc Cain,
68 N. W. Rep. 163.
See, on this subject, 33 Am. L. REG. N. S. 899; 34 AM.
L. REG. N. S. 71.
According to a recent decision of the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky, City of Louisville v. Wilson, 36 S. W. Rep. 944,
Pullic the members of the boards of.public safety andOfficers,
Salaries, public works, the secretaries of the boards, the
Reduction, assistant bailiff of the police court, and the stenog-
Constitutional
Law rapher of the city court, are " officers " within the
meaning of the constitutional provision that the salaries of
public officers shall be neither increased nor diminished during
their term of office ; and an ordinance reducing the salaries of
those officers, during their term of office, is therefore uncon-
stitutional and void; but a statute providing, that the salary of
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an officer shall be "not less than" a certain sum does not fix
it at that sum, and therefore an ordinance passed after their
appointment, fixing their salaries at a higher figure than those
sums, is not unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court of Michigan has recently decided, that
Public though a city charter requires contracts to be
Contracts, let to the lowest bidder, the lowest bidder
Rights of
Lowest under a proposed contract, whose bid has been
Bidder,
Action for rejected, has no right of action against the city
Profits to recover the profits which might have been made
had hit bid been accepted: Talbot Pay. Co. v. City of Detroit,
67 N. W. Rep. 979-
In a recent case before the Supreme Court of Michigan,
Tobias v. Mich. Cent. R. R. Co., 68 N. W. Rep. 234, where the
Railroads, plaintiff's intestate was injured in an accident at a
crossings, railroad crossing, the evidence showed that the
Electric Bell,
Negligence, company maintained an electric bell at the cross-
Contributory ing, which was rung automatically by passing
Negligence trains, but was often out of order and did not ring
properly, and was in that condition when the plaintiff's intes-
tate was injured. It also appeared that a train approaching
the crossing could be seen for a long distance. The trial
judge instructed the jury that if there had been no bell it
would not have been prudent to cross the track without first
looking; that the presence of the bell did not release the
deceased from the duty of exercising due care; that the
question was how far the deceased, as a prudent man, was
eutitled to rely on the bell; and that, if he had looked, he
,could have seen the coming train. It was held, in error, that
these instructions properly presented the issues.
A railroad ticket entitling a designated person to a stated
number of single continuous trips, for each of which a sepa-
rate coupon is attached, "between" two specifiedTickets,
Coupons, stations, which stipulates that "passage shall be
C onstructlon taken only on such trains as stop at the above-
named stations," and also that "this ticket shall be good only
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for continuous trips between" those stations, confers on the
holder of the ticket the right, upon surrendering one of the
coupons, to ride from an intermediate station to either of
the two stations mentioned in the ticket, or from either of
those stations to the intermediate station, provided he boards
a passenger train that, upon its regular schedule, stops at the.
intermediate station as well as the two specified stations:
Georgia R. R. & Banking Co. v. Clarke, (Supreme Court of
Georgia,) 25 S. E. Rep. 368.'
The Supreme Court of Georgia, in a very able and exhaus-
tive opinion, (but regrettably marred by an unnecessary flip-
Railroad pancy of tone in some paragraphs,) has torn itself
Mortgages, loose from the trammels of authority, which would'
Claims for
Tort, postpone a claimant for damages for a tort to the
Priority lien of mortgage bondholders of a corporation,
and adopted a doctrine which seems thoroughly in accord
with the principles of justice. It holds that when judgment on
a claim against the mortgagor for a tort has been obtained
before the mortgage is foreclosed or a receiver appointed, the
damages so reduced to judgment should be regarded as
operating expenses charged by the judgment upon income as
against the mortgages and all their incidents, and should take
precedence of such claims in a decree for the distribution of
income: Green v. Coast Line R. R. Co., 24 S. E. Rep. 814.
In Michigan, a by-law of a savings bank, organized under the
general banking laws, and required by statute to have capital
Savings stock and stockholders, which provides that the
Banks, bank shall not be liable to a depositor for payment,
By-Laws,
Payment of of the moneys deposited to the holder of his pals
Deposit book, though it should be stolen from the dep6si-
tor, is not binding on the depositor, unless he has notice
thereof; since, under the laws of that state, the officers of the
bank, who make the by-laws, are agents of the bank and not
of the depositor, and Pub. L. Mich. 1887, p. 233, requires
that deposits shall be paid to the depositor or his personal
representatives: .Ackenlzausen v. People's Savings Bank,
(Supreme Court of Michigan,) 68 N. W. Rep. i18.
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In states where a savings bank is managed by trustees for
the benefit of the depositors, a different rule prevails : Sulli-
van v. Institution, 56 Me. 507, 1869 ; Goldrich v. Bank, 123
Mass. 320, 1877; Schoenwald v. Bank, 57 N. Y. 418, 1874;
Ap.pleby v. Bank, 62 N. Y. 12, 1875.
Equitable set-off cannot be pleaded by way of answer, but
Set-off, the relief sought must be invoked by bill or
Equitable, cross-bill: American Natl. Bk. v. Nashville Ware-
Pleading hoise & Elevator Co., (Court of Chancery Appeals
of Tennessee,) 36 S. W. Rep. 9 o.
In a recent case in the Queen's Bench Division, tried before
Mathew, J., without a jury, the plaintiffs shipped goods which
Shipping, were contraband of war -on the defendants' ship for
Bill of Lading, carriage from London to Yokohama, under a bill
Excepted
Perils, of lading containing the exception of "restraint of
Restaintof princes," and also a special clause "that if the
Contraband entering of or discharging in the port (of dis-
of War,
Risk charge) shall be considered by the master unsafe
of Seizure, by reason of war the master may land thePart ..
Performance goods at the nearest safe and convenient port."
of Contract of
Carriage, The ship also carried goods belonging to other
Refusal to shippers. In the course of her voyage the ship
Complete,
Discharge at arrived at Hong Kong, and on the day of her
'Intermediate arrival there, war was declared between China
Port,
Justification and Japan. There were, at the time, several Chi-
nese war vessels in and around the port of Hong Kong, and
if the master had attempted to sail thence with the plaintiff's
goods on board, there would have been a serious danger
of their seizure and confiscation. The master, accordingly,
landed them there. The plaintiffs brought an action for
breach of contract to carry the goods to Yokohama. But the
court held, (I) that risk of seizure of the goods, if it was
attempted to carry them further, amounted to a " restraint of
princes," within the exception; (2) that such risk of seizure,
on the voyage between Hong Kong and Yokohama, ren-
dered the entering of or discharging in the port of Yokohama
PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
unsafe within the meaning of the special clause; and (3) that
the master's duty to take care of the cargo justified him, apart
from any exceptions in the bill of lading, in landing the plaint-
iff's goods where he did: Nobel's Explosives Co. v. Jenkins &
Co., [1896] 2 Q. B. 326.
A sleeping-car company, though not a common carrier,
owes its passengers certain general duties, arising from the
Sleeping-car contracts which it makes with them, and involving
Companies, the exercise of ordinary and reasonable care and
Duty to
Passengers, attention towards, them, and a violation of these
Liability duties may be made the subject of an action
either ex contractu or ex deliclo; and in an action against a
sleeping-car company for failure to discharge its duty to pro-
vide a properly-warmed and comfortable car for its pas-
sengers, it cannot be said, on demurrer, that damages alleged
to have been caused by such failure, consisting in suffering
from the low temperature, and the contracting a violent cold,
which resulted in permanent injury to the eyes, are so remote
as not to be recoverable: Hughes v. Pullman Palace Car Co.,
(Circuit Court, E. D. Missouri, N. D.) 74 Fed. Rep. 499.
In a recent case before North, J., of the Chancery Division
of the High Court of Justice of England, a testatrix, who had
Will, bequeathed all her shares in two specified railway
Construction, companies, had never owned any shares in either,Falsa
Demostratio but at the date of her will held debenture stock
of each company, which she continued to hold at the time of
her death; and it was held that the debenture stock passed
under the bequest: In re Weeding, [1896] 2 Ch. 364.
Ardemus Stewart.
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